
This book, volume 18 in the Cognitive Linguistics Research series edited by René Dirven, Ronald W. Langacker, and John R. Taylor, results from a special session on cognitive linguistics and non-Indo-European languages held at the International Cognitive Linguistics Association Conference, July 10-16, 1999 in Stockholm. Cognitive linguistics is based on the premise that language is a part of cognition “which reflects the interaction of social, cultural, psychological, communicative and functional considerations” (p. 455).

The editors justify the need for this work as follows (p. 3):

In view of the apparent potential of Cognitive Linguistics as a general theory applicable to all languages, we are surprised by what appears to be an increasing dominance of representation from English and other IE languages in Cognitive Linguistics forums. We feel strongly that the representation of non-IE languages must be expanded so that our framework early-on establishes a broad base of expertise with all of the world's major language families, thereby avoiding the insularity for which generative linguistics was so strongly criticized in its early years.

Due primarily to space limitations but also in accordance with my background and interests, I have chosen to focus on five of the 16 essays which I believe have significant, broad interest for general linguistics. This decision, however, in no way implies that those not discussed are less satisfactory. These latter articles are listed with their authors at the conclusion of my remarks.

One of the presuppositions of cognitive linguistics and a theme running throughout all the papers in this work, is that the multiple meanings of a morpheme or word “are usually related to one another in motivated, but often unpredictable ways. The organization of such meanings into
complex categories, related to one or more prototypes, with the particulars related to these prototypes at varying conceptual distances is illustrated in numerous analyses" (p. 1). I agree with the editors' pronouncement that cognitive linguistics has great potential as a linguistic theory which interrelates grammar, semantics, and culture – anthropological themes quite Sapir-Whorfian in outlook.

Eugene H. Casad's "Speakers, context, and Cora conceptual metaphors" (pp. 65-89) uses the work by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Leonard Talmy, and especially Ronald W. Langacker, to describe Cora (a Uto-Aztecan language spoken in Mexico) speakers' use of the verb stem 'iée' 'to pass beyond a conceptual reference point' to express the notion of 'making a mistake'. The author postulates that the schematic prototype of 'to make a mistake' is 'to miss the mark'. The data collected on Cora metaphorical usage of 'iée' plus various locative prefixes are convincing pieces of evidence that the idea of 'getting in the wrong lane' driving a car, e.g., can be thought of as 'missing the mark' (p. 74). The arguments made for a Cora cultural model for discussing "mistakes" are convincing and offer insights into the nature of the Cora "mind."

Douglas Inglis' "Conceptual structure of numeral classifiers in Thai" (pp. 223-46) examines the nature of some Thai classifiers; e.g., bay, which prototypically indicates plants and trees, but by metaphorical extension comes also to mark flat, thin items such as playing cards and tickets in addition to documents, invoices, receipts, sails of boats, and propellers. This is compared with lûuk 'offspring', as in lûuk-chaay 'son' (lit., 'offspring-male'), lûuk-sāaw (lit., 'offspring-female') 'daughter', lûuk-mēēw 'kitten'(lit., 'offspring-cat'), and lûuk-māa 'puppy'(lit., 'offspring-dog') (p. 227). The classifier lûuk is used for pineapples, mangoes, and watermelons and should be thought of as the fruit, i.e., offspring of the tree (ibid.). The aforementioned fact leads the author to generalize that "a grammatical theory should account for both the grammatical and lexical
semantics since they obviously interact to compose the grammaticality of the nominal and therefore are crucial to a full understanding of the classifier phenomenon" (pp. 232-33). There is something to be said for the cognitive linguistic point of view that lexicon and grammar are but two points on a continuum.

Margaret Ukosakul's “Conceptual metaphors motivating the use of Thai ‘face’” (pp. 275-303) utilizes work by William Croft, Zoltán Kövecses, and Anna Wierzbicka (among others) to demonstrate that the Thai conception of ‘face’ is related to their idea of honor and shame (cf. the parallel expression in English ‘lose face’). Her research is solidly based on a collection of 170 Thai idioms using näa ‘face', the analysis of which follows the model proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). The Thai people consider the feet to be dirty, as in Islamic culture (since feet touch the dirty ground, directly or indirectly via footwear). As is common in Islamic culture also, the showing of the sole of the foot is very rude and to be avoided (in fact, this is a Thai taboo, p. 280). This cultural fact is used by the author to explain why the metaphor ‘to step over one's face' means ‘to disregard one's honor' (ibid.). Many examples reveal that näa is interconnected with shame, and the parallel with English shamefaced is cited (p. 287). My guess is that one can find parallels in many other languages as well, which would integrate this field with that of linguistic typology and language universals (this is reminiscent of the research on color terminology in languages, for which see Berlin and Kay [1969]).

Ming Yu's “The bodily dimension of meaning in Chinese: What do we do and mean with “hands?” (pp. 337-62), a study in what is called cognitive semantics (p. 337), explores the metaphoric and metonymic range of šou 'hand'. The examination of numerous compounds (e.g., háo šou (lit., ‘good-hand' [corrected from the cited falling and rising tone háo] 'good hand; past master'; dá šou (lit., ‘beat-hand'[corrected from the cited falling and rising tone dâ]) 'hired
roughneck; hired thug’, pp. 340-41) leads the author to conclude that “meaning can be said to be the extension of bodily experiences through human imagination structured by metaphor and metonymy [synecdoche: ASK]” (p. 356).

The parallels and near-parallels with English are germane, and once again let me assert that this is one ripe area for research in linguistic typology and language universals. For example, a thief has “sticky hands” in Chinese but “sticky fingers” in English.

There is one fact about English which bothers me. While I agree that right hand, [also right-hand man: ASK], or right-handed man means ‘capable assistant’, I am unfamiliar with left-handed meaning ‘unskillful; awkward; unsuccessful’ (p. 341). These senses are not cited in the Cambridge International Dictionary of English (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 808), although a “left-handed (= back-handed) compliment is a remark that seems to say something pleasant about a person but also could be an insult”. There are dictionaries of English which cite the meaning ‘awkward’ (e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary, 4th ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000, p. 999); however, I believe this sense is rare in American English. The meanings ‘unskillful; unsuccessful’ are not recorded in AH4.

Mari Siiroinen’s “Subjectivity and the use of Finnish emotive verbs” (pp. 405-17) posits a cogent explanation for the differences in emotive verbs chosen: pelkää ‘be afraid’ vs. perlotta ‘frighten’. In the author's words: "Which of these verbs is chosen depends on the focus of attention and the point of view in the discourse" (p. 414). She goes on: “If the topic of the previous discourse is the experiencer” (ibid.), one says hän pelkää sitä ‘He is afraid of it’. “If the topic of discourse is the stimulus” (ibid.), one uses se pelottaa häntä ‘it frightens him’. The outside observer’s and the experiencer's points of view may be merged" (ibid.) yielding häntä perlotta (se) ‘he is frightened of it’. The conclusion is that these three choices are available for many emotive verb pairs; e.g., sure
~ suretta ‘be sad’ (p. 415). The parallel with English ‘I like it’ and ‘it pleases me’ (p. 406) is not entirely accurate, since ‘I like you’ means something different from ‘you pleased me’. In fact, something can please me which you have done (e.g., preparing my lunch) while at the same time, I don’t like you personally.

The remaining essays are: Rick Floyd, “Completion, comas and other ‘downers’:

REFERENCES


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